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Abstract
In this paper, I evaluate the impact of innovative activity of financial
agents on their fragility in a competitive framework. There exist a vast
array of concerns about the interconnection of financial innovations,
financial distress of firms and financial crises provided by theoretical
arguments. I build on these and assess empirically the causal link be-
tween a financial agents’ innovativeness and stability.
Using a unique data set on financial innovations in the USA between
1990 and 2002, I show that a larger degree of innovation negatively
(positively) affects firm stability (fragility) after controlling for the un-
derlying firm characteristics. The results are robust against different
modifications of innovation measures and against different fragility pa-
rameters indicating profitability, activity risk and risk of insolvency.
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1 Introduction
Numerous researchers have analyzed the causes for distress of financial
agents during the recent financial crisis starting in 2007. Through both theo-
retical and empirical analyses, they came up with a variety of reasons. These
include panics of bank customers and major investors, shocks to money sup-
ply, debt financing and to the real economy, as well as the interconnectedness
of banks and their complexity. A recent strand of literature1 tries to argue,
however, that a competitive financial system and the non-patentability of
financial innovations (FI) can cause a financial crisis. These papers analyze
the incentives to innovate and the relation to financial distress. Despite the
plentiful theoretical literature, only a few empirical studies on that relation
exist. These have provided evidence on the drivers for product development
and competition in financial markets. This work provides additional insight
into the empirical relationship between innovation and stability in financial
markets.
In this paper, I follow the innovation-fragility view2 and explore whether
more innovative financial systems are more prone to financial crises. To do
so, I analyze the proposed causal and positive relationship between FI and
incidents of a financial distress in an empirical setup with US data on the
agent level. The precipitating question is who innovates in the financial mar-
ket? Is the degree of innovativeness positively related to an agent’s profit
volatility? Does innovative activity increase the risk of insolvency? In other
words, is competition through innovation negatively related to stability?
1Starting with Bhattacharyya/Nanda (2000). A more detailed literature review is given
in Section 2. This also provides the theoretical underpinnings for the empirical analyses
in Section 3.
2See Beck et al. (2012).
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I utilize count data and patents to measure FI on a micro level from Lerner
(2006) and relate agent-level variations in innovativeness to profit volatility
of financial institutions while controlling for firm characteristics and time
trends. Based on an empiral setup that corresponds to Hasan et al. (2009),
Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt and Huizinga (2010), Beck et al. (2012), and Lepetit and
Strobel (2012), I investigate the link between profit volatility and FI in a
dynamic panel model. I find a significant positive relation which implies
a negative impact on the stability of the financial system. Furthermore, I
check my results against a number of different extensions. While regressions
with interactions between firm characteristics and FI provide ambiguous
results, my findings are confirmed with different innovation measures and
different fragility measures. In addition, more innovative firms face higher
losses during a period of crisis.
The paper is structured as follows. First, I discuss previous literature in
the area. In Section 3 I introduce the data while in Section 4 I present
the empirical analysis. In Section 5 I discuss the results, while Section 6
concludes the paper and suggests topics for future research.
2
2 Literature Review
This paper draws on literature from two distinct research areas: (i) micro-
and macroeconomic research on the existence of financial crises and (ii)
investigations into the foundations of FI.3
2.1 Financial Crises
The first field of research pertains to the origins and persistence of financial
crises, or more particularly, the investigation of causes for financial distress
of single agents providing any kind of financial services. In their seminal
paper, Allen and Gale (2000) investigate possible contagion and bubbles in
financial networks. They build a model of contagion with perfectly compet-
itive banking and show that a first-best allocation of risk-sharing is possible,
but fragility still persists. Subsequently, Upper and Worms (2004) confirm
Allen and Gale’s (2000) model by empirically evaluating the risk of conta-
gion and credit risk in the German interbank lending market.4 Their analysis
provides two results: First, credit risk may trigger a domino effect in that
there exists considerable scope for contagion even with safety mechanisms.
Second, more concentrated structures can lower the threshold for contagion.5
Furthermore, Allen and Gale (2004) analyze the relation between compe-
tition and financial stability. Here, they find a negative trade-off between
both while considering a variety of different settings such as general equi-
3General surveys about research on financial agents with particular focus on asymmetries
of information and security design are given by Allen and Winton (1995) and Duffie and
Rahie (1995).
4They use balance sheet data of German banks to estimate bilateral credit relationships.
5Many more papers can be found which empirically analyze the causes for financial crises
both at a micro- and macro-level. Since I want to focus on the distinct relationship
between FI and financial health, an extended overview on that area of literature would
be beyond the scope of this paper.
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librium models, agency models, Schumpeterian competition and contagion.
In a three-period model with risky and standard assets as well as timing
incongruity, they show that greater competition is good for efficiency, but
bad for financial stability. Additionally, Allen et al. (2009) provide a thor-
ough review on financial crises. They find that most financial crises arise
from panics, business cycle fluctuations or contagion, and derive from this
evidence a common sequence of events.6
2.2 Financial Innovations
A second strand of literature looks at the origins and existence of financial
innovations.7 The seminal definition of FI is given by Tufano (2003): It
is the creation of financial instruments (both product and process) by in-
vention or diffusion of products, services or ideas. He states that FI exists
because of the incompleteness of markets, for managing risk, for pooling
of funds and because of regulation. Frank and White (2004, 2009) review
the technological changes and innovations in commercial banking over the
last 25 years. They employ the same definition of FI as Tufano (2003) and
argue that FI reduce costs and risks, pool funds and provide a tool to serve
demands of investors. In addition, they survey the literature to illustrate
innovation patterns over the investigated period.
From a theoretical perspective, numerous papers provide arguments for the
existence of innovations in financial markets. Most recently, Michalopoulos
6With surging money supply, asset prices and credit volumes increase which inevitably lead
to a price bubble bound to burst. A banking crisis is then followed by an exchange-rate
crisis and a substantial drop in real output. Brunnermeier (2009) presents an overview
on the development of the recent financial crisis and uses micro- and macro-level data to
suggest reasonable policy interventions.
7Tufano (2003), Frank and White (2004, 2009) as well as Lerner and Tufano (2011) provide
overviews on innovations in the financial market.
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et al. (2011) link FI to the endogeneous growth theory while Carvajal et
al. (2012) examine innovations in frictionless financial markets with short
selling. They find incomplete markets even with costless innovation and
competition. Ferreira et al. (2012) argue that the form of equity financing
determines FI incentives. In their model, they suggest to go public for ex-
ploiting existing ideas and go private for exploring new, risky ideas. Song
and Thakor (2010) and Shen et al. (2012) provide arguments for collateral-
motivated FI and link possible innovation cycles in financial markets to
government regulation such as Basel III.
Empirical assessments of innovations in financial markets have started with
research in the 1980s and 1990s.8 In his early contribution, Tufano (1989)
argues that FI provide first-mover advantages. He assesses the dynamics of
innovations and competition by analyzing data on 58 publicly offered FI in
the years 1974 to 1987 which raised USD 280 billion and providing cross-
sectional regressions of the underwriting spread on firm characteristics.9 He
finds that 20% of new securities being issued in 1987 have not been in exis-
tence in 1974 and that new product ideas diffuse rapidly across competitors
so that banks do not enjoy monopoly pricing with innovations, but rather
capture a larger market share with lower prices than their imitators.
Lerner (2002) looks at financial patents during the period 1971 to 2000
and analyzes the impact of the State Street decision10 on the degree of inno-
8See e.g. Miller (1986, 1992), Merton (1992), Frank and White (2004, 2009).
9Tufano (1989) relied on three data sources: first, a literature search using ABI-Inform and
Business Periodical Index; second, interviews with investment bankers; third, company
data from SDC and IDDIS.
10State Street Bank vs. Signature Financial Group was a 1998 decision by the US Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC) regarding the patentability of business methods.
Herein, the CAFC rejected the notion of a business method exception and allowed the
protection of an invention if it involved some practical application and some tangible
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vation observable in the market. He uses the classification of the US Patent
and Trademark Office and the Delphion IP Network to identify 445 financial
patents and finds a surge in patenting filed mostly by large corporations. In
addition, Lerner (2006) investigates the origins of innovations by developing
a new measure for FI. His regressions show that small, less profitable firms
are more innovative with an additional agglomeration effect. More recently,
Lerner (2010) inquires about litigation of patents on FI.11 He analyzes fi-
nancial patent awards by the US Patent and Trademark Office between 1976
and 2003 in combination with firm-level data from public records. He finds
that first, patents on FI are litigated more often than normal patents; sec-
ond, litigated patents are mostly owned by small firms or individuals and
have more claims and citations than other financial patents; and third, large
firms are more often defendants in litigation.
Finally, Boz and Mendoza (2010) examine the interaction of FI, learning
and collateral constraints in a stochastic equilibrium model of household
debt and land prices. They use an experimental setup with switching be-
tween high- and low-leverage regimes according to Bayesian learning and
find that innovations in financial markets lead to boom-bust cycles.
The financial innovations considered in this paper differ from innovations
in product markets in several important ways. In general, consumers of fi-
nancial services face opacity about the portfolio of financial agents and their
quality provided in financial services. Also, research has not yet produced
result, which with regards to financial patents was deemed the pricing. However, the
2008 CAFC decision In re Bilski rejected the tangible result test as inadequate. The
US Supreme Court affirmed this judgement in Bilski vs. Kappos. This leaves companies
with great uncertainty over the patentability of financial innovations.
11This again draws on Lerner (2002).
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any structural model with which to estimate both supply and demand of
FI. Frank and White (2004) survey empirical studies on FI and point to
the general scarcity in research in that field. Lerner and Tufano (2011) also
show some differences between FI and manufacturing innovations, most no-
tably stressing different dynamics and agency structures. They point out
the problems of assessing FI due to the rarity of R&D spending by financial
agents, the infrequency or non-existence of financial patents and the opacity
of FI by private firms.
2.3 Incentives to Innovate and Financial Crises
This paper makes use of a new strand of literature combining both afore-
mentioned research fields. Most work focuses on the innovation-fragility
view coined by Beck et al. (2012) that innovations may have adverse ef-
fects on competition and stability. It begins with early theoretical work
by Bhattacharyya and Nanda (2000). Their paper is the first to connect
incentives to innovate and the analysis of financial crises in a theoretical
setup. Because client characteristics, market structure and the volatility
affect switching costs and costs of delayed adoption, banks with greater
market power and more secure relationships with customers are more likely
to innovate. Empirical assessments of the causal link between innovations
and financial instability have been scarce.
Most recently, two lines of argumentation have emerged. The first one fo-
cuses on incentive structures and volatility in financial markets. Thakor
(2012) analyzes the relation between incentives to innovate and financial
crises. He makes use of Allen and Gale’s (2004) model with three periods
where the distinction is not between standard and risky assets, but now
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between standard and innovative assets. Financial agents then face the
trade-off between making profits from innovation and refinancing risks. In
his model, the degree of innovativeness is positively related to the refinanc-
ing risk which makes imitation less likely and drives up profits. Reasons
for financial distress are then the competitive financial system and the non-
patentability of FI because of the correlation of default risks if FI can be
imitated.
Beck et al. (2012) evaluate the respective relationships between FI and real
sector growth, real sector volatility and bank fragility using bank-, industry-
and country-level data from 32 countries during the period 1996 to 2006.
Approximating Tufano’s (2003) definition of FI by financial R&D intensity
obtained from the OECD, they analyze the innovation-fragility view on FI.
Namely, they relate country-level variation in FI to bank-level variation in
profits and volatility. Their results show that innovativeness leads to in-
creasing fragility, risk taking, profit volatility and bank losses during crises.
Herein, smaller, fast growing banks are more fragile in countries with more
FI while smaller, less leveraged banks are more effected by agglomeration
effects.
A second line of argumentation focuses on investors’ behavior. Shleifer and
Vishny (2010) set up a behavioral finance model where they assume opti-
mism of investors as stimulus for demand for new securities and pessimism
as a shock leading to financial crises. Mispricing occurs because financial
agents profit from investors’ misperceptions. Depressed securities then have
adverse welfare effects ex post as they cut off lending to new instruments.
Overall, securitization raises the level of investment and cyclicality. Hender-
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son and Pearson (2011) show that investors can be exploited by innovative
financial products. Their event study proposes that issuers innovate to sell
new securities at a risk-adjusted premium to uninformed investors because
innovativeness increases complexity and ambiguity. Subsequently, issuers
exploit investors’ misunderstandings of financial market. The authors pro-
vide reasons for excess demand in overconfidence, framing and loss aversion
of investors.
Jeon and Nishihara (2012) extend Shleifer and Vishny’s (2010) model and
allow agents to securitize risky assets with leverage and asymmetric infor-
mation. They find that risk retention requirements imposed by governments
reduce welfare. Concurrently, Gennaioli et al. (2012) argue that FI cause
crises because of neglected risks. Their research is also an extension of the
Shleifer and Vishny (2010) paper whereby agents engineer securities per-
ceived to be safe but exposed to neglected risks which leads to excessive
security issuance. They apply a model of belief formation to relate FI, se-
curity issuance, risk perception and financial fragility.
This paper follows the recent strand of new literature on the relationship be-
tween incentives to innovate and financial instability. The paper’s contribu-
tion is the empirical connection between financial innovations and instability
of financial agents. There exist only a few empirical analyses focusing either
on particular innovations (Henderson and Pearson 2011) or on cross-country
comparisons (Beck et al. 2012) so far. To the best of my knowledge this
paper is the first quantitative assessment of the innovation-fragility view at
the agent level. I employ a data set by Lerner (2006) and augment it with
performance and stability measures so that I can study the effect of firm-
9
level variation in FI on the stability of financial agents. Although I focus
here on the USA, this firm-level analysis can offer insights into the incentives
to innovate and dynamics in a competitive financial system.
3 Data
The data set measures financial innovations in the USA from 1990 until 2002
via a unique counting mechanism.12 Lerner (2006) investigates the origins
of innovations and develops a new FI measure based on news stories from
the Wall Street Journal during the period 1990 to 2002 which he merges
with additional information from the SEC, Compustat, finance journals and
the US Patent and Trademark Office to establish a link between innovative
ability, firm characteristics and patenting.13 The sample consists of firms
with either at least one innovation observed by the measure during the time
period or being active in the SIC codes 60 through 64 and 67.14
The data set consists of four different groups of variables:15 First, I use
firm characteristics to control for firm-specific effects. In accordance with
Lerner (2006), I use the logarithm of total assets to measure firm size. Prof-
itability (Opprof) is defined as earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation
and amortization (EBITDA) divided by revenues, and leverage is defined
as the ratio of the book value of a firm’s long-term debt to total capitaliza-
tion. Further control variables include firm age, cash equivalents, employees,
shareholders’ equity, long-term debt, common market value and revenues.
12The data were kindly provided by Josh Lerner, Harvard Business School.
13See also Lerner (2002) for his aforementioned earlier work on financial patents.
14These SIC codes include firms operating in the financial services business such as insur-
ance, banking, financial advisory and so on except for real estate.
15For complete descriptions of the variables used here, see Table A1 in the Appendix.
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Second, the data set includes performance measures like EBITDA, net in-
come, retained earnings as well as return on assets (ROA) and return on
equity (ROE) which are used to derive the stability measures and provide
information about the competitive nature.
Third, I measure stability of financial institutions with the Z-score. The Z-
score is a measure of bank solvency and corresponds to (ROA+CAR)/σ(ROA).
It ”indicates the number of standard deviations that a bank’s rate of return
on assets can fall in a single period before it becomes insolvent. A higher
Z-score signals a lower probability of bank insolvency” (Beck et al. 2012).16
For robustness checks, I later also use other stability measures such as the
capital-asset ratio (CAR), standard deviations of returns, and the Sharpe
ratio which is defined as ROE/σ(ROE).
Fourth, innovation is measured by the count of patent applications, patents
issued and stories on innovations per year and firm. I also include a measure
for the agglomeration effect by counting the number of innovations by other
firms within the same two-digit ZIP code area as a firm.
All financial data is in million 2002 US Dollars. Financial and company
data comes directly from Compustat or is calculated from its pool of vari-
ables. The count data on innovations comes from articles issued in the Wall
Street Journal or the Factiva database on technological inventions. Patent
data comes from the US Patent and Trademark Office. For a comprehensive
explanation of the data set, see Lerner (2006). I clean the data from coding
16See Lepetit and Strobel (2013) for more information on firm’s insolvency risk and dif-
ferent approaches to time-varying Z-score measures. They provide a derivation of the
Z-score and discuss several ways to estimate means and standard deviations of the vari-
ables used to calculate the measure. I follow their recommended specification.
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errors and outliers, and perform some plausibility checks. Any observations
with implausible values for balance sheet items (e.g. negative revenues) are
dropped. I also exclude observations with negative Z-scores. The final sam-
ple is an unbalanced panel with 19,895 firm-year observations of 3,042 firms.
Like any other measure of FI, the count measure used here also has its lim-
itations. It necessarily excludes private firms not listed in Compustat. Fur-
thermore, the time period is rather limited and the methodology to source
the counts of innovations from the articles is based on stylized facts of FI.
Also, problems in assessing FI exist due to the rarity of R&D spending by
financial institutions, the infrequency of financial patents and the intrans-
parency of FI by private firms as discussed by Tufano (2003), Frank and
White (2004, 2009) and Lerner and Tufano (2011). Therefore, the count
measure introduced by Lerner (2006) and applied here to analyze finan-
cial fragility is a promising first start to assess empirically the connection
between financial innovations and instability of financial agents.
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4 Empirical Analysis
This section explores the relationship between FI and financial agents’ fragility
empirically. I first provide a description of the data and then present the
empirical model specification.
4.1 Descriptive Statistics and Properties
Table 1 provides an overview of the summary statistics of the variables. It
shows that there exists great heterogeneity among firms in terms of size and
profitability. Because I include all firms active in financial services, leverage
ratios are comparably low. Stability measures are constructed from the firm
characteristics to capture a firm’s insolvency risk and activity risk. Higher
numbers for the Sharpe ratio and the Z-score reflect less fragility. Moreover,
the count data on FI includes a lot of zeros as indicated by the low means.17
Generally, variances of the variables are quite large. For most variables,
mean values are larger than the median because there are a lot of firms in
the sample whose observations depict values close to zero for the variables
used here.
Observations are evenly distributed over the time period and firm char-
acteristics exhibit a high degree of persistence. About 11% of firms in the
sample have observations for the entire time period. About 26% of firms
have 8 or more consecutive observations. On average, the data set has 9
observations per firm.
17In total, the data set includes only 588 incidences of financial innovation.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics of Key Variables
Variable Mean Median Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Age 9.550 6.000 11.971 0 77
Assets 12806.760 604.177 57441.090 0 1097190
Cash Equiv. 1348.839 28.258 8608.241 0 316206
Leverage 0.278 0.213 0.263 0 0.999
Long-term Debt 1698.329 36.057 11639.600 0 468570
Market Value 2939.847 138.685 15583.860 0 535947
Pref. Stock 38.948 0.000 223.152 0 5712
Revenues 2607.716 78.583 11729.980 0 186857
Sh. Equity 1306.896 91.860 5115.215 -515.745 153738
Opprof 0.077 0.291 6.850 -587.544 19.483
Ret. Earnings 776.869 24.195 3527.743 -15801 81210
ROA 0.050 0.011 1.723 -16.444 235.667
ROE 0.835 0.104 49.136 -125.869 4787.999
CAR 0.226 0.127 3.231 -441 3.414
HHI 0.014 0.014 0.002 0.011 0.019
σ(ROA) 0.142 0.008 4.875 0 650.898
σ(ROE) 1.557 0.046 45.011 0 2194.872
Sharpe 3.702 2.211 8.642 -103.399 346.778
Z-score 42.926 22.897 194.269 0 12381.450
Innovations 0.016 0.000 0.165 0 6
Patents 0.033 0.000 0.416 0 15
Applications 0.031 0.000 0.432 0 21
R&D 45.594 0.000 436.137 0 9845
FI by Others 2.442 0.000 3.441 0 12
Notes: N=19,895. The list is ordered according to the four different groups
of variables mentioned above. See Table A1 in the Appendix for definitions of
the variables. All financial data is in million 2002 US Dollars and comes from
Compustat. Count data on innovations comes from the Wall Street Journal,
the Factiva database or the US Patent and Trademark Office, collected by
Lerner (2006).
Figure 1 displays firm characteristics over time. There exists a general in-
crease in the absolute values of these firm-specific variables. Similar to
Figure 1, Figure 2 presents the evolution of a firm’s performance and sta-
bility measures over the time period. There is no clear trend in rising or
falling profitability of financial institutions. While retained earnings and the
Sharpe ratio increase over time, operational profitability, the capital-asset
14
ratio and returns on assets and equity decline.
Figure 1: Firm Characteristics
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Figure 2: Profitability and Stability Measures
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Figure 3 presents how the count of FI has developed over time. The notable
peak towards the late 1990s is due to the aforementioned State Street deci-
sion. Observations for patents lag behind applications because the average
time period between applying for a patent and granting patents is about two
to three years. Only applications for patents granted during the time period
are included in the data set. Overall, the number of observed innovations
is rather low in comparison to the overall size of the data set so that this is
one point of caution.
Figure 4 presents a comparison of fragility by grouping firms with measured
15
innovation and with no count, respectively, and by plotting the evolution of
both sets. In accordance with my hypothesis, linear predictions of Z-scores
of firms without innovation are slightly higher than those with counts of
innovation. Additionally, a time trend indicates that the relation becomes
stronger.
Figure 3: Evolution of Innovative Activity
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Figure 4: Evolution of Z-scores
0
2
4
6
8
10
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Log of Z-scores without innovation
Log of Z-scores with Innovation
Fitted values
Fitted values
Following the descriptives, a variety of univariate analyses provide a first
glance at the variables’ behavior and properties. Firm characteristics are
correlated with each other and over time. This also drives autocorrelation
in Z-scores by construction. Including lagged dependent variables in the
regressions captures most of the autocorrelation. While the FI measures
16
are significantly correlated with each other, a F-test also shows joint sig-
nificance. Also, fragility (Z-scores) and FI measures are significantly posi-
tively (negatively) correlated.18 Mann-Whitney U tests show that the mean
and variance of Z-scores are significantly different with and without inno-
vation. A series of panel-based unit root tests reject the hypothesis that
the Z-scores are first-order integrated (I(1)).19 Control variables are care-
fully selected to avoid problems of multicollinearity. A robust version of the
Wu-Hausman test by Wooldridge (2002) shows that fixed effects modeling
is preferred over a random effects setup. Furthermore, Breusch-Pagan and
White tests show that error terms are heteroskedastic, while Arellano-Bond
and Breusch-Godfrey tests show that the error terms are correlated with
each other.
4.2 Empirical Strategy
Based on the micro-level database on FI in the US between 1990 and 2002
presented above, I relate agent-level variations in innovativeness to prof-
itability and profit volatility of financial institutions while controlling for
firm characteristics and time trends. For my empirical setup I build on
Hasan et al. (2009), Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt and Huizinga (2010), Lepetit and Stro-
bel (2012), Beck et al. (2012) and Bertay et al. (2013). They analyze profits
and fragility of financial institutions with a variety of different setups and
also assess the reliability of the Z-score.20 Because of the data properties
presented above, my baseline model specification is as follows.
18See Table A2 in the Appendix.
19I use augmented Dickey-Fuller and Phillips-Perron tests to analyze cointegration. If
Z-scores were really I(1), then their time series would be a random walk with drift. In
fact, the data is trend stationary and I use a time trend in my regression models to
account for that.
20Their work shows that the Z-score is a feasible indicator to measure financial stability
of firms and is commonly used in the literature.
17
Zi,t = ρZi,t−1 + βXi,t + γYi,t + αi + δt + i,t (1)
where indices i, t stand respectively for firm and time, Z is the Z-score
per firm and period.21 Including lagged dependent variables allows me to
account for the persistence of firm characteristics which also reflect in the Z-
scores by construction and the general persistence over time. X is the vector
of firm characteristics for which data are available while Y is the vector of
different financial innovation indicators. To account for firm heterogeneity, I
use ratios of balance sheet items relative to asset size for the control variables
and employ the logarithm of all independent variables that are not ratios.
The regression model also includes αi and δt to account for omitted firm-
specific and time fixed effects, respectively. The Newey-West-type robust
error term  is clustered at firm-level and allowed to be heteroskedastic,
autocorrelated and spatially correlated.
21Because the Z-score is highly skewed and to avoid truncation, I use ln(1 + Z-score) in
the regressions.
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5 Results
In this section, I discuss the main results and perform a number of robustness
checks. I also extend the model to further investigate the innovation-fragility
view in more detail.
5.1 Baseline Model
I compare different versions of the dynamic panel model set up in Section
4.2 which enhances the static linear fixed effects model by including autore-
gressive coefficients for fragility. This allows me to capture feedback from
current or past shocks to current values of the dependent variable. This
specification is adequate in the presence of autocorrelated error terms and
high persistence in the dependent variable which I have shown earlier.
Table 2 provides the overview of the different model specifications. Baseline
innovative capacity in firms is captured by firm size, profitability and lever-
age which Lerner (2006) has shown to be important drivers of incentives to
innovate. In all regressions, I include firm characteristics, year fixed effects
and a constant but suppress their coefficients in the tables.
Column 1 to 4 provides the Driscoll-Kraay (1998) estimator with firm fixed
effects and lagged dependent variables interchangeably. Column 4 depicts
the full model specification presented in Section 4.2. Even though firm fixed
effects cover average innovative ability of a firm while lagged dependent vari-
ables capture time trends, the γ coefficients to measure FI remain negative
and statistically significant. Once accounting for firm differences and time
trends, patenting becomes sufficiently less important for firm stability.
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Column 5 presents the results for the period 1990 until 1998 only. Remem-
ber the State Street decision by the CAFC in 1998.22 This has provided
firms with legal certainty about what kind of FI can be legally protected.
Hence, more technology spillovers should theoretically be observed in the
pre-1998 period because of the legal uncertainty prior to the CAFC deci-
sion. Given these spillovers from FI, I expect to observe a stronger relation
between firm instability and innovative activity. I split the data sample into
pre-State Street and post-State Street periods. Analyzing the subsample in-
deed shows larger γ coefficients of the FI measures prior to 1998 and hence
confirms that the spillover effect of FI further decreases stability.
Moreover, I analyze the impact of competitive pressure on the proposed
positive relationship between FI and fragility. I thus include the Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index (HHI) in column 6. Because an increase in the HHI signals
rising market power and weakening competition, the positive regression co-
efficient for the HHI indicates that competition and stability are negatively
correlated which is the same conjecture Allen and Gale (2004) made. Con-
trolling for competition does not change the γ coefficients of the FI measures
or the agglomeration effect.
Overall, results show that indeed there exists a significant positive relation
between FI and fragility (negative relation between FI and Z-scores) albeit
small, but patenting seems to be no factor. The size of the coefficients how-
ever corresponds to the correlations from the univariate analyses in Section
4.1. Surprisingly, the agglomeration effect as measured in FI by others is
very weak.
22I already mentioned this in the Literature Review (Section 2) and it is discussed in
Lerner (2002).
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5.2 Robustness
I check the robustness of my results. Foremost, the results in Table 2 are ro-
bust against including or excluding different firm-specific control variables.
I also use data on revenues and common market value instead of total assets
to control for firm size but the results do not change. If I include a dummy
variable for incidences of FI instead of the three different count measures,
the coefficient is negative but not significant.
In order to check whether my results are due to a particular econometric
specification, I run different panel estimators. I compare my baseline model
specification to a pooled feasible GLS estimator with a panel-specific AR(1)-
disturbance, a Prais-Winsten regression to account for autocorrelated error
terms, and a Newey-West heteroskedasticity- and autocorrelation-consistent
(HAC) estimator. I find qualitatively similar results. The advantage of
Driscoll-Kraay (1998) standard errors is that they expand Newey-West HAC
estimators to include correlation between panels and that the estimator does
not place restrictions on the limit behavior of the number of panels.
I also run dynamic panel data estimators. I use the Arellano-Bond (1991)
estimator by instrumental-variables (IV) estimation of the parameters of the
first-difference model using lags of regressors as instruments.23 Additionally,
I use the Blundell-Bond (1998) estimator because the Arellano-Bond (1991)
estimator performs poorly with large autoregressive disturbances.24 I find
23I have shown earlier that the data is trend stationary. Because the Arellano-Bond (1991)
estimator relies on first differences, it consumes most of the variation between observa-
tions for innovation indicators since their within-variation (variation over time) is larger
than their variation between panels. Thus, coefficients for the innovation indicators turn
out smaller and not significant in the regression.
24The Blundell-Bond (1998) estimator is a system GMM estimation method which en-
hances the Arellano-Bond (1991) estimator with additional moment conditions. Both
22
qualitatively similar results.
In any estimation of fixed effects models for short panels when lagged de-
pendent variables are present, coefficients may be downwardly biased. This
is called Nickell (1981) Bias whose size is relative to the time period T of the
data set. It is given here by 1/T = 1/13 = 0.07. Thus, as T → ∞ the bias
disappears.25 That’s why I compare the Driscoll-Kraay (1998) estimator
with the aforementioned dynamic panel data estimators which are consis-
tent. Two caveats arise from dynamic panel data estimators in this case,
namely that the IV estimation greatly increases the mean squared error and
that errors are assumed to not be serially correlated. On the other hand, the
Driscoll-Kraay (1998) estimator works with great precision although poten-
tially biased. Thus, a trade-off between correcting biases against decreases
in efficiency is inherent. Fundamentally, trading a small reduction in the
bias for a large decrease in efficiency sounds questionable. Assuming the
Nickell (1981) bias is negligible since T = 13 is a reasonable time period and
given the small coefficient for lagged Z-scores from Table 2, I further pursue
the Driscoll-Kraay (1998) estimator with fixed effects and lagged dependent
variables in my analysis.
5.3 Extensions
I extend the baseline model with a couple features. First, I want to explore
the relationship between innovation and fragility across firms with differ-
ent characteristics. Thus, I generate interaction terms of the FI measures
estimators are consistent, but they assume that there exists no autocorrelation in the
error terms, that panel-level effects are uncorrelated with the first differences and that
good instruments are available.
25Compare Behr (2003) for a discussion of dynamic panel data estimators and their ap-
plication to financial data.
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with assets, profitability and leverage.26 Table 3 provides the piece-wise
inclusion of these interactions into the regression with the Driscoll-Kraay
(1998) estimator assessed above. Column 1 and 4 show the effect of FI on
fragility with heterogeneous firm size. The relationship is stronger for larger
banks but only for innovative activity captured through patenting. Overall,
patenting decreases stability significantly. Column 2 and 4 show that the
different profitability levels have no impact on the effect of FI on fragility as
expected. Finally, column 3 and 4 display the effect of FI on fragility with
different leverage ratios. The relationship is stronger when firms are more
leveraged and the impact of innovation increases with the leverage ratio.
Across all models, the positive (negative) relation between innovation and
fragility (stability) prevails, while the size of the coefficients differs across
specifications.
Second, I investigate the robustness of my results from Section 3.4 against
modifications of innovation measures as depicted in Table 4. Column 1 pro-
vides the regression results with the Driscoll-Kraay (1998) estimator from
Table 2. Subsequently, column 2 uses a weighting mechanism to account
for sole or collaborative inventions, column 3 uses only highly innovative
activities as classified by a three-part scheme introduced by Lerner (2006),
column 4 provides a combination of 2 and 3 and finally, column 5 introduces
R&D expenditures as a further control.27 Results are confirmed. The pos-
itive relation between innovation and fragility is persistent while patenting
has no effect.
26For the interaction terms, I multiply my FI indicators with assets, profitability and
leverage, respectively.
27See Table A1 in the Appendix for a description of the exact modifications.
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Table 3: Interaction with Firm Characteristics
Firm Size Profitability Leverage Compound
Model
ln(1+Z-scoret) ln(1+Z-scoret) ln(1+Z-scoret) ln(1+Z-scoret)
ln(1+Z-scoret−1) 0.013* 0.013* 0.013* 0.013*
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
ln(assets) -0.155*** -0.155*** -0.154*** -0.154***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
EBITDA/revenues 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Leverage ratio -0.228*** -0.227*** -0.227*** -0.227***
(0.024) (0.024) (0.025) (0.025)
FI by others in 2-digit zip code 0.002* 0.002* 0.002* 0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Innovations -0.016 -0.010*** -0.103** -0.097***
(0.019) (0.004) (0.043) (0.034)
Patents -0.042*** 0.002 -0.036* -0.035**
(0.012) (0.005) (0.020) (0.017)
Applications -0.016 -0.008* -0.044 -0.060*
(0.012) (0.005) (0.033) (0.035)
Innovations * ln(assets) -0.048 0.191
(0.158) (0.195)
Patents * ln(assets) -0.402*** -0.672***
(0.111) (0.195)
Applications * ln(assets) -0.136 -0.029
(0.091) (0.081)
Innovations * EBITDA/revenues 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
Patents * EBITDA/revenues -0.001*** -0.002***
(0.000) (0.000)
Applications * EBITDA/revenues -0.001 -0.001*
(0.000) (0.000)
Innovations * leverage ratio -0.117** -0.139**
(0.052) (0.054)
Patents * leverage ratio -0.035 0.027
(0.022) (0.020)
Applications * leverage ratio -0.046 -0.055
(0.033) (0.041)
Controls Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y Y
Firm FE Y Y Y Y
Constant Y Y Y Y
Observations 14,770 14,770 14,770 14,770
Number of firms 2,660 2,660 2,660 2,660
R-squared 0.634 0.634 0.634 0.634
Notes: See Table A1 in the Appendix for definitions of the variables. Count data on innovations comes from
the Wall Street Journal, the Factiva database or the US Patent and Trademark Office, collected by Lerner
(2006). All financial data is in million 2002 US Dollars and comes from Compustat. All columns incorporate
the baseline model from column 4 of Table 2. Column 1 includes interaction terms between firm size and FI
measures. Column 2 includes interaction terms between profitability and FI measures. Column 3 includes
interaction terms between leverage ratio and FI measures. Finally, column 4 includes all interaction terms. In
all regressions, I include firm characteristics as controls, firm and year fixed effects, and a constant but suppress
their coefficients in the tables. Control variables include firm age, cash equivalents, employees, retained earnings,
shareholders’ equity, preferred stock and long-term debt (all as ratios relative to assets or logarithms). Driscoll-
Kraay (1998) robust standard errors are clustered at firm-level and presented in parentheses. *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Third, I further explore the robustness of results by investigating the compo-
nents of the Z-score and alternative measures for firm fragility in Table 5.28
Thus, I keep the right-hand side variables the same and compare different
left-hand side variables. I respectively use ROA, ROE and the capital-asset
ratio to assess profitability and capitalization, the volatility of ROA and
volatility of ROE to measure a firm’s activity risk, and finally, the Sharpe
ratio as an alternative measure for the risk of insolvency. Specifically, the
Sharpe ratio describes how well the return compensates the investor for the
risk taken. Column 2 and 3 show that profitability is positively affected
by patenting behavior, but surprisingly, the innovation coefficient is signifi-
cantly negative although small. Capitalization in column 4 negatively affects
firm stability on a small scale, but only in patenting. Unusually, activity
risk is not affected by a firm’s degree of innovation as depicted in columns 5
and 6. Lastly, innovation continues to positively relate to risk of insolvency
although the coefficient becomes insignificant whereas unexpectedly patent-
ing positively affects excessive returns as shown in column 7.
Fourth, another investigation looks at the impact of FI on profitability dur-
ing a financial crisis. Did FI hurt financial institutions during a period of
financial market breakdown? In a cross-sectional setting where independent
variables from 1999 only are used, I analyze whether firms make larger losses
during financial distress when innovating. Table 6 provides an overview of
the summary statistics of the variables for 1999. The cross-sectional sample
has 1,781 observations. For most variables, mean values are larger than the
median indicating a few large firms drive up average values. Values for most
differences in profitability are negative. Variances in general are large.
28Because the different measures are highly skewed and to avoid truncation, I use the
logarithm for the dependent variables in the regressions, except for standard deviations.
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Table 6: Summary Statistics of Cross-Section (1999)
Variable Mean Median Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Age 9.226 5.000 11.699 0 74
Assets 15381.500 614.032 65763.220 0 893649
Cash Equiv. 1503.317 27.252 9642.401 0 205371
Leverage 0.326 0.293 0.276 0 0.997
Long-term Debt 1954.220 51.799 12102.890 0 339221
Market Value 4597.746 116.612 26350.170 0.062 535947
Pref. Stock 33.535 0.000 183.772 0 3375
Revenues 2802.985 79.385 12301.180 0 184589
Sh. Equity 1496.865 87.944 5640.443 -44 83397
∆(Opprof) -0.533 0.014 16.200 -523.908 130.719
∆(ROA) -0.096 -0.001 1.382 -41.827 1.671
∆(ROE) 0.195 -0.004 6.999 -51.006 230.774
Innovations (avg.) 0.012 0.000 0.075 0 1.200
Patents (avg.) 0.024 0.000 0.219 0 5.000
Applications (avg.) 0.040 0.000 0.352 0 7.000
R&D 48.874 0.000 457.900 0 7502.168
FI by others 1.002 0.000 1.713 0 4.000
Notes: N=1,781. See Table A1 in the Appendix for definitions of the variables.
All financial data is in million 2002 US Dollars and comes from Compustat.
Count data on innovations comes from the Wall Street Journal, the Factiva
database or the US Patent and Trademark Office, collected by Lerner (2006).
FI measures are averaged over the period 1990 to 1999.
For the cross-sectional analysis, I use as the dependent variable ∆(Opprof),
∆(ROA) and ∆(ROE), respectively, where ∆() = ()2002 − ()1999.29 I
expect that the difference will be negative for most firms and should be larger
for more innovative firms. The model specification for the three regressions
is as follows.
∆()i = βXi + γYi + i (2)
where index i stands for the firm and the dependent variable is the perfor-
mance change between 2002 and 1999 calculated as the difference in ROA,
ROE, Opprof = EBITDA/revenues, respectively, between the values in
29The year 1999 has the most observations per year in the data set and the NASDAQ had
its ten-year peak then, while in 2002 the NASDAQ considerably dropped because of the
burst of the ICT bubble.
29
the respective years. Again, X is the vector of firm characteristics in 1999
while Y is the vector of different financial innovation indicators. I use fea-
sible GLS estimation with heteroskedastic error terms  in the regressions.
FI measures are averaged over the period 1990 to 1999 because this cap-
tures overall innovative activity per firm. Table 7 provides the results which
suggest that more innovative firms face higher profitability declines dur-
ing distress. The significantly negative sign on γ is consistent with the
innovation-fragility view and suggests that firms with higher FI suffered
more in a crisis.
30
Table 7: Comparison of Profitability Changes
(1) (2) (3)
∆(ROA) ∆(ROE) ∆(Opprof)
Log of assets 0.044*** -0.329*** -0.279***
(0.002) (0.008) (0.019)
EBITDA/revenues 0.010*** -0.008
(0.003) (0.011)
Leverage ratio -0.152*** 1.190*** 0.675***
(0.004) (0.029) (0.047)
FI by others in 2-digit zip code -0.040*** 0.041*** -0.150***
(0.005) (0.002) (0.016)
Innovations (avg.) -0.087*** -0.315*** -1.634***
(0.006) (0.021) (0.178)
Patents (avg.) -0.511*** 0.366*** -1.696***
(0.028) (0.060) (0.543)
Applications (avg.) 0.249*** -0.223*** 0.751**
(0.018) (0.037) (0.302)
Controls Y Y Y
Constant Y Y Y
Observations 1,202 1,201 1,196
Number of firms 1,202 1,201 1,196
R-squared 0.044 0.048 0.023
Notes: See Table A1 in the Appendix for definitions of the variables.
Count data on innovations comes from the Wall Street Journal, the
Factiva database or the US Patent and Trademark Office, collected by
Lerner (2006). FI measures are averaged over the period 1990 to 1999.
All financial data is in million 2002 US Dollars and comes from Com-
pustat. In column 1, I use the change in ROA as dependent variable, in
column 2, I use the change in ROE as dependent variable, and finally,
in column 3, I use the change in operational profitability as dependent
variable. In all regressions, I include firm characteristics as controls and
a constant but suppress their coefficients in the tables. Control vari-
ables include firm age, cash equivalents, employees, retained earnings,
shareholders’ equity, preferred stock and long-term debt (all as ratios
relative to assets or logarithms). Robust standard errors are clustered
at firm-level and presented in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1.
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6 Conclusion
In this paper, I evaluate the relationship between financial innovations and
the fragility of financial institutions. Theoretical literature provides strong
evidence for why financial crises exist and why firms engage in producing
financial innovations. A recent strand of research tries to combine both ar-
eas and analyzes the impact of innovative activity of financial agents in a
competitive framework. Particularly, this mostly theoretical literature links
profit volatility to innovative activities and predicts a positive relationship.
That is, the degree of innovation negatively affects firm stability.
I base my analysis on a unique data set that counts financial innovations in
the USA between 1990 and 2002 provided by Lerner (2006) and augment it
by performance and stability measures. Then, I build on empirical frame-
works by Beck et al. (2012) and others to quantitatively assess the so called
innovation-fragility view on a firm level. I can show that a larger degree of
innovation positively (negatively) affects firm fragility (stability) after con-
trolling for the underlying firm characteristics. A couple of extensions to the
initial model show that my results are quite robust. Different modifications
of the innovation measures yield the same outcomes. Furthermore, I use
different fragility parameters measuring profitability, capitalization, activity
risk and risk of insolvency and find that the results support my argumen-
tation. In addition, firms with higher pre-crisis FI face higher losses during
a period of financial crisis. Overall, my analyses support the innovation-
fragility view.
Further research could include applying VAR models that take greater ac-
count for the persistence in firm characteristics and causality. Expanding
32
the time dimension may make the analysis more robust while cross-country
comparisons could provide policy recommendations. Additionally, insights
into the dynamics of innovative activity could be deduced from a structural
approach to modelling FI.
33
Appendix
Table A1: Overview of Variables, Definitions and Sources
Variables Definitions Sources30
Financial innovation measures
Applications Patent applications counted per
firm in a year.
US PTO31, col-
lected by Lerner
(2006)
Applications-wt Weighted patent applications
per firm in a year where the sum
of 1 (count) is divided among
the firms mentioned in the ar-
ticle about the innovation.
US PTO, col-
lected by Lerner
(2006)
Innovations Count of stories from newspa-
per articles and databases on in-
novations per firm in a year.
WSJ32 and FD33,
collected by
Lerner (2006)
Innovations-wt Weighted count of innovations
(as above).
WSJ and FD, col-
lected by Lerner
(2006)
Innovations-ab Count of only major innova-
tions where Lerner (2006) ap-
plies a three-part classification
scheme (A,B,C).
WSJ and FD, col-
lected by Lerner
(2006)
Innovations-wt-ab Weighted count of major inno-
vations (as above).
WSJ and FD, col-
lected by Lerner
(2006)
FI by Others Number of financial innovations
in the same year by other firms
with headquarters in the same
two-digit zip code as the firm.
WSJ and FD, col-
lected by Lerner
(2006)
Patents Count of patents granted to a
firm in a year with respect to
the financial services area.
US PTO, col-
lected by Lerner
(2006)
Patents-wt Weighted count of patents (as
above).
US PTO, col-
lected by Lerner
(2006)
30I make use of the data set constructed by Lerner (2006) for which he draws on various
data sources. In addition, I define and compute additional factors, which were previously
not used, for my empirical investigation. All financial data is in million 2002 US Dollars.
31US Patent and Trademark Office
32Wall Street Journal
33Factiva database
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Financial Institution’s performance measures
EBIT Earnings before interest and
taxes per firm and year.
Compustat
EBITDA Earnings before interest, taxes,
depreciation and amortization
per firm and year.
Compustat
Net Income Net income of a firm in million
2002 USD per year.
Compustat
Opprof Operational profitability con-
structed as EBITDA / revenues
(opprof = EBIT / revenues,
whenever EBITDA is unavail-
able).
computed from
Compustat data
Ret. Earnings Retained earnings in million
2002 USD per firm in a year.
Compustat
ROA Return on assets constructed as
net income / assets.
computed from
Compustat data
ROE Return on equity constructed as
net income / shareholders’ eq-
uity.
computed from
Compustat data
Financial Institution’s stability measures
CAR Capital-asset ratio constructed
as shareholders’ equity / assets.
computed from
Compustat data
∆(Opprof) Difference between operational
profitability in 2002 and 1999.
computed from
Compustat data
∆(ROA) Difference between return on
assets in 2002 and 1999.
computed from
Compustat data
∆(ROE) Difference between return on
equity in 2002 and 1999.
computed from
Compustat data
σ(ROA) Standard deviation of ROA for
each agent calculated over the
sample period.
computed from
Compustat data
σ(ROE) Standard deviation of ROE for
each agent calculated over the
sample period.
computed from
Compustat data
Sharpe Sharpe ratio constructed as
ROE / σ(ROE). Larger values
imply less excessive risk for a
certain return.
computed from
Compustat data
Z-score Index of bank solvency con-
structed as (ROA+CAR) /
σ(ROA). Higher Z-score implies
lower probability of failure.
computed from
Compustat data
35
Other agent-level variables
Age Age of firm in relation to its
foundation or IPO.
Compustat
Assets Total assets of each financial in-
stitution in million 2002 USD
per year.
Compustat
Cash equiv Cash equivalents in million 2002
USD per firm in a year.
Compustat
Emp Employees per firm and year. Compustat
HHI Herfindahl-Hirschman In-
dex defined as the sum
of squared shares of rev-
enues oer firm to total rev-
enues per year, i.e. HHI =
ΣNi (revenuesi/total revenues)
2
per year.
computed from
Compustat data
Leverage Ratio of the book value of a
firm’s long-term debt to to-
tal capitalization (book value
of long-term debt and preferred
stock and the market value of
common stock).
Compustat
Lt. Debt Long-term debt in million 2002
USD per firm in a year.
Compustat
MV-common Common market value in mil-
lion 2002 USD per firm in a
year.
Compustat
Pref. Stock Preferred stock in million 2002
USD per firm in a year.
Compustat
R&D Expenditures per firm for re-
search and development in mil-
lion 2002 USD in a year.
Compustat
Revenues Revenues in million 2002 USD
per firm in a year.
Compustat
Sh. Equity Shareholders’ equity in million
2002 USD per firm in a year.
Compustat
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